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1 Introduction
In standard economic modeling, diversity among agents reflects diﬀerences either in pref-
erences or in the information they possess. Agents may not have identical information
about the fundamentals or about the knowledge of other agents. In this paper, we wish to
explore a diﬀerent type of asymmetry among agents. In everyday language, these asym-
metries are expressed in statements such as “A understands the market better than B”.
Such statements reflect the fact that agents diﬀer in their ability to understand market
behavior even if they possess the same raw information.
Introducing these features into a model is not an easy task. In this paper, we sug-
gest a simple and naive modeling device that is applied to several elementary economic
frameworks. A common characteristic of the ensuing models is that diﬀerences in agents’
abilities to process equilibrium prices allow for the existence of “complicated” equilibria
in which an agent’s performance depends on his ability to recognize dynamic patterns.
Specifically, we will construct dynamic models of markets in which prices fluctuate in a
pattern that is independent of the fundamentals and that can be recognized only by the
more competent agents.
We wish to emphasize that this paper is only an exploratory exercise and we make
no pretence as to the realism of the models’ predictions.
2 Modeling ability to recognize patterns
Our modeling device is related to a mathematical observation that is well known in
the field of combinatorics. Consider the infinite sequence {at} of the letters 0 and 1,
consisting of the repetition of the 8-tuple 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1. We are interested in the
following two properties of the sequence:
A. At each point in the sequence, knowledge of the previous 3 letters is suﬃcient
to correctly predict the next letter.
B. At each point in the sequence, knowledge of the previous 2 letters provides no
information about the next letter.
If an agent’s performance depends on his ability to correctly predict the next element
in the sequence on the basis of the last k observations, an agent with k ≥ 3 can make
perfect predictions whereas an agent with k = 2 can do no better than to correctly guess
the next letter 50% of the time.
Formally, consider a set Λ of cardinality L, an alphabet, whose elements are called
letters. Let Λ∞ be the set of all infinite sequences of letters. Given an infinite sequence
{at}, we refer to any sequence (at+1, ...., at+m) as a word of length m. For any t, the word
h = (a1, ..., at−1) is the history at period t and we say that the element at follows h.
The word (at−m, ..., at−1) is the m-end of h. The sequence is generated by the function
g : Λk → Λ (referred to as a generating rule of order k) if at = g(at−k, ..., at−1) for all
t. A sequence is cyclical if it consists of the infinite repetition of the same m-tuple for
some m.
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A DeBruijn sequence of order k is an infinite sequence of letters (at) that satisfies
the following two properties:
(A) It has a generating function g : Λk → Λ of order k.
(B) If t1 < t2 < ... < tL is such that tj+1 is the minimal t > tj for which the
k − 1-end of the history at tj+1 is the same as at t1, then {atj}Lj=1.
It is easy to see that the two conditions imply that any k-word is the k-end of some
history1 and that the sequence is cyclical. Hence, a DeBruijn sequence of order k has the
property that any k-word is always followed by the same letter, whereas any k− 1-word
is followed by any a ∈ Λ with frequency 1/L. Facing such a sequence, an agent having
recall of the previous k letters can in principle, construct a rule that correctly forecasts
the next letter. However, any rule based on the previous k− 1 letters does not allow the
agent to correctly forecast the sequence more than 1/L of the time.
Example: Let Λ = {0, 1}. The infinite repetition of the k-tuple below generates the
following DeBruijn sequences:
For k = 2, (0, 0, 1, 1).
For k = 3, (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1) as well as (0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1).
For k = 4, (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1), etc.
The existence of a DeBruijn sequence for any order and any alphabet of finite cardi-
nality is well-known2 in the combinatorics literature (see, for example, Bondy and Murty
(1976), pages 181-2). The proof is presented below for completeness.
Proposition 1 (DeBruijn) For any finite alphabet Λ and any k, there is a DeBruijn
sequence of order k.
Proof : Consider the directed graph (V,→) where V , the set of nodes, consists of all
Lk−1 words of length k−1 and, for any node (a1, ..., ak−1) and any a ∈ Λ, (a1, ..., ak−1)→
(a2, ..., ak−1, a). The graph is connected and has the property that there is an equal
number of arrows in and out of each node. This is a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the existence of “Euler cycle” (a path passing through every arrow once). The length
of such a path is Lk. Let (bt) be a sequence such that the tth arrow in the Euler cycle is
(a1, ..., ak−1) → (a2, ..., ak−1, bt). The sequence (bt) satisfies our claim. Indeed, note that
knowledge of the k−end of the sequence at period t is equivalent to knowledge of the
tth arrow which implies knowledge of the next arrow that determines bt+1. Knowledge
of the k − 1 end of the sequence at period t is equivalent to the knowledge that the
tth arrow connects to the node (bt−k+1, ..., bk−1) except that there are L possible arrows
originating from this node.¥
1Let (b1, ..., bk) be an arbitrary word of length k. If (a1, ..., ak) is a word in the sequence, then
(a2, ..., ak, b1) is also a word in the sequence and, by repeating this argument k times, it follows that
(b1, ..., bk) is also a word in the sequence.
2We would like to thank Noga Alon for referring us to this literature.
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DeBruijn sequences of order k allow only uniform beliefs among agents with depth of
memory smaller than k. However, one can use Proposition 1 to show that other beliefs
can be generated as well.
Proposition 2 Let Λ be an alphabet and let α(·) be a probability measure on Λ such
that, for any a ∈ Λ, α(a) is a positive rational number. Then, for any k, there is an
infinite cyclical sequence of letters such that all k-words appear in the sequence and any
k − 1-word (x1, ..., xk−1), is followed by a with limiting frequency α(a).
Proof : Let α(a) = m(a)/m where allm(a) are natural numbers. Define an auxiliary
alphabet Λ0 = {(a, l)| a ∈ Λ and 1 ≤ l ≤ m(a)} having cardinality m. By Proposition 1,
there is a cyclical sequence {xt} of elements of Λ0 such that, given any k − 1-word, the
“next” letter is equally likely to be any letter in Λ0. Let {yt} be the sequence of letters
in Λ such that yt = a if and only if xt = (a, l) for some l. This sequence is cyclical, all
the k-words appear, and the limiting frequency by which a letter a ∈ Λ will follow a
word (y1, ..., yk−1) is equal to α(a) by construction.¥
Note that we do not characterize the minimal order of the generating rule needed to
generate the sequences which are described in Proposition 2. In general, the minimal
order will exceed k.
In the following analysis, an agent will face a deterministic cyclical sequence of let-
ters which represent entities such as prices or nature’s actions. The agent will have a
stationary instantaneous utility function u(a, x), where a is his action and x is the next
element in the sequence. The agent’s ability will be characterized by a natural number k.
Observing the sequence, the agent will be able to compute the limiting frequencies with
which any word of length k is followed by a specific letter. Our behavioral assumption is
that, given any word of length k, he chooses an action that optimizes his instantaneous
expected utility where his beliefs are the long-run frequencies.
Strictly speaking, the number k is a bound on the memory of the agent. However, we
prefer a broader interpretation in which k is a measure of his sophistication. An agent
who observes a sequence of letters is able to grasp its generating rule if it is of order k or
lower. Standard questions in IQ tests provide a useful analogy for this interpretation. A
finite sequence of 0’s and 1’s is presented and the subject must determine its continuation.
A subject with k = 1, for example, is able to uncover the pattern of a stationary or
alternating sequence, whereas an agent with k = 2 is able to uncover the pattern of a
sequence such as 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1,.
Although we do not model the process by which the agent forms his beliefs and do
not consider the agent’s intertemporal preference, our analysis does extend to the case
of an agent with bounded recall who chooses strategies in order to maximize the limit
of the averages of his instantaneous utility or the discounted sum for a suﬃciently high
discount factor.
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3 A Model of Price Discrimination
In this section, we demonstrate a potential application of the modeling device proposed
above in a simple economic context. Consider a monopolist who produces one good
and wishes to discriminate among consumers with diﬀerent reservation values. We will
demonstrate that if the consumers diﬀer in their ability to recognize temporal price
patterns, the monopolist can sometimes increase his profits beyond the level he would
have achieved if no such diﬀerentiation had existed.
Suppose that the monopolist produces a perishable good in discrete quantities. Time
is discrete and the monopolist is operating in a repetitive fixed environment. The mo-
nopolist chooses and commits in advance to an infinite sequence of prices {pt}. His aim
is to maximize the limit of the average profits (or the discounted sum with a suﬃciently
high discount factor). The monopolist can produce the good promptly in every period
at a cost equal to zero (adding the cost variable makes the condition in the following
proposition easier to satisfy).
The market has two consumers, 1 and 2. Consumer i has a reservation value vi,
interpreted as the cost of obtaining the good instantaneously by other means. Consumer
i obtains a utility higher than vi from consuming the good. We assume that v1 < v2.
The price for period t is posted only at the beginning of the period. However a
consumer must decide at the end of period t− 1 (that is, after pt−1 is posted but before
pt is posted) whether to enter this market and pay a cost equal to ε, where v1 > ε > 0.
The need to make a decision in advance might be due, for example, to the need to make
a specific complementary investment. If he enters the market in period t, he learns about
pt and purchases the good if and only if pt does not exceed his reservation value.
In order to make the decision as to whether to enter the market in period t, a con-
sumer has to form a belief about the price he will be charged. Consumer i is characterized
by a number ki. Given an infinite price sequence {pt}, consumer i can base his inference
at the end of period t− 1 only on the last ki prices (pt−ki , ..., pt−1). We assume that the
probability that consumer i assigns to the event in which a price p follows the ki prices
(pt−ki , ..., pt−1) is the long-run frequency with which p follows the ki-word (pt−ki , ..., pt−1)
along the sequence {pt}. In every period, a consumer maximizes his expected surplus.
In the following proposition we will show that if k1 ≤ k2, the monopolist’s optimal
policy is a constant price, that is, the monopolist cannot use the limitations and dif-
ferences in ability to recognize price patterns in order to extract a greater surplus from
consumers. However, if k1 > k2, we identify conditions on the reservation values and the
entry cost that allow the monopolist to increase his profits using a non-stationary price
sequence. The pattern of prices will be recognized correctly by consumer 1 but not by
consumer 2. Note that a negative correlation between vi and ki which implies that a
more sophisticated consumer has better outside options, is not unreasonable.
Proposition 3 (a) If k1 ≤ k2, then the optimal cyclical price sequence is constant.
(b) If k1 > k2, 2v1 − v2 < ε, and v2 − v1 < ε, a DeBruijn sequence P ∗ of order k1,
consisting of the prices pL = v1 − ε and pH = 2v2 − v1 − ε, is strictly better for the
monopolist than any constant price sequence.
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Proof : (a) Take a cyclical sequence of prices {pt}. Let T = {t|t ≥ k2+1}. For every
finite sequence of prices z, let T (z) = {t ∈ T |the history (p1, ..., pt−1) ends with the word
z}. The set Ii = {T (x)|x is a vector of ki prices} is a partition of T . The information
available to agent i is identical in all periods in the same cell of Ii, . Thus, one can think
of Ii as the information partition of agent i. The behavior of consumer i in any cell of Ii
is constant. I2 is a partition of T that refines I1.
Consider a cell of I1 where consumer 1 enters the market. The average price in this
cell cannot exceed v1−ε. Thus, the average profit in such a cell cannot exceed 2(v1−ε).
Consider a cell of I1 where agent 1 does not enter the market. In any of the subcells in
I2, (recall that I2 refines I1) the average price cannot exceed (v2− ε). Thus, the average
profit of the monopolist cannot exceed max{2(v1− ε), (v2− ε)}. Hence, a constant price
policy charging either v1 − ε or v2 − ε achieves this bound.
(b) Consider a DeBruijn sequence P ∗ of order k2+1, consisting of the prices pL and
pH . Consumer 2, being less sophisticated, believes that the price is either pL or pH with
equal probability. Since (pL + pH)/2 = (v2 − ²), he always enters the market and, since
pH ≤ v2, (by v2 − v1 < ε), he buys the good at both prices. Consumer 1 recognizes
when the price is low and only then enters the market. Thus, the average profit that P ∗
yields is (v2 − ²) + (v1 − ²)/2. Since by hypothesis 2v1 − v2 < ε, the optimal constant
price sequence equals v2 − ε and thus the claim follows.¥
Note that, as in other models, the ability of the monopolist to price discriminate may
enhance the welfare of all participants in the market. In particular, under condition (b),
the pricing policy P ∗ makes the monopolist better oﬀ leaving both consumers as well oﬀ
as under the optimal constant price policy.
The pricing policy P ∗ is not necessarily an optimal cyclical policy. The monopolist
can raise his profits by increasing the high price up to v2 and reducing its frequency.
Consider, for example, the case where v1 = 4, v2 = 6 and ε = 3. The number α = 0.4
satisfies αv2 + (1− α)(v1 − ²) = v2 − ². If the monopolist were able to generate a price
sequence such that consumer 1 would always correctly predict the price correctly while
consumer 2 would always believe that the high price appears with probability 0.4, the
monopolist would achieve a profit equal to v2 − ² + (1 − α)(v1 − ²) which is greater
than (v2 − ²) + (v1 − ²)/2, the profit he obtain using P ∗. As shown in Proposition 2,
there is a cyclical sequence of the prices v1− ² and v2− ² such that consumer 2 believes
that the high price is charged with probability 0.4. If k1 is suﬃciently large, consumer
1 will correctly predict the price. However, as already noted, we do not have an exact
expression for determining how large k1 should be for a given k2.
Bibliographic comment: In several previous models of price discrimination, uncer-
tainty unrelated to economic fundamentals plays a key role. In Salop (1977), price
dispersion allows the producer of a single good to price discriminate among consumers.
Agents obtain price oﬀers through search. Diﬀerences in search costs are correlated with
willingness to pay. The monopolist spreads the spectrum of prices so that consumers
with higher search costs find it optimal to buy the good at high prices.
In Rubinstein (1993), the monopolist, who is, for example, a supplier of a service,
wants to limit the number of consumers accepting his price oﬀer in some states of nature.
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A price oﬀer is a vector of numbers and consumers diﬀer in their ability to distinguish
among the price oﬀers. The monopolist’s optimal strategy is to complicate the price
oﬀers so that only the more sophisticated agents will purchase the good when he wishes
to limit demand.
4 A Market Example
We proceed with another “toy model” that demonstrates the theoretical possibility that
diﬀerences in the ability of agents to understand price patterns allows for the existence
of equilibrium fluctuations that are unrelated to fundamentals and that benefit the more
competent agents.
Consider a market with one indivisible good, labor and money. The market operates
in periods t = 1, 2, ....
On the supply side of the indivisible good there are three producers. Each has a
technology that produces one (and only one) unit of the good per period. Producer P0
can produce one unit costlessly and has a reservation price of w − 2 units of money
for selling the unit produced. Each of the other two producers, P1 and P2, needs to
employ one worker. Labor is used in indivisible units and wages are fixed at the level w.
Producers P1 and P2 must decide at the beginning of each period, before that period’s
price is determined, whether to produce the good or not. The objective of P1 and P2 is
to maximize their expected money profits.
On the demand side of the indivisible good, one buyer wishes to buy at most two
units of the good. In each period he endowed with w + 2 units of money. He evaluates
one unit of the good as equivalent to w − 2 units of money and an additional second
unit as equivalent to w + 4 units of money.
The buyer has two units of labor. He is always willing to work for the fixed wage w
(per unit of work). He purchases 0, 1, or 2 units of the good to maximize his surplus.
No transfer of money or goods from period to period is feasible.
A candidate for an equilibrium consists of the following components for every period
t:
¥The price of the indivisible good in units of money.
¥The decision of P1 and P2 as to whether to hire a worker and produce the good.
¥The decision of P0 as to whether to produce a unit of the good.
¥The decision of the consumer as to how many units to buy.
In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold in every period t:
¥ Each of the producers P1 and P2maximizes his expected profit given his beliefs about
the price at beginning of period t.
¥ The market for the good clears, that is, the number of units produced is equal to the
number of units demanded by the consumer.
¥ The producer P0 and the consumer (given his budget constraint) make decisions
consistent with their reservation values.
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Thus, this is a sticky price model in which the wage is fixed and the labor market is
not required to clear.
In any stationary equilibrium, the profits of the producers P1 and P2 are equal to
zero. If the price is below w, P1 and P2 will be idle. In this case, the only equilibrium
price for the good is w− 2. If the price is above w, then each of the three producers will
supply one unit. Hence, the market for the good cannot clear since the buyer wishes to
buy at most two units.
Now assume that P1 and P2 diﬀer in their depths of memory, that is, kP2 > kP1.
Suppose that w > 6 and consider a DeBruijn sequence of prices of order kP1 + 1, with
the alphabet consisting of two prices, w + 1 and w − 2.
P1 cannot predict the price and his expectations are that the price is equally likely
to be w + 1 or w − 2. He will not produce the good since, on average, he will incur a
loss if he does. Producer P2 enters the market when he anticipates (correctly) that the
price is w + 1. Thus, in periods where the price is w + 1, the total supply is 2 and the
consumer has an income (2w+2) suﬃcient to purchase two units of the good. In periods
where the price is low only P0 produces the good and the buyer is able to buy only one
unit (w > 6 implies that w + 2 < 2(w − 2)).
In this equilibrium, the consumer has the resources to purchase more than one unit of
the good only when the price is high. In “booms”, two units are produced and sold to the
consumer in exchange for his wages and his initial wealth. In “recessions”, production
is not profitable for P1 and P2 and, despite the low price, the consumer does not have
suﬃcient resources to purchase more than one unit of the good. The profits of producer
P2 are equal on average to 0.5 which exceed the zero profits of the stationary price
equilibrium.
If the producers have identical abilities, an equilibrium would imply for P1 and P2
either “no trade” or “trade with zero profits”: P1 and P2 would be unable to extract
from the consumer any part of his initial endowment of money. However, in the above
non-stationary equilibrium, the more “sophisticated” seller extracts some of the buyer’s
surplus despite the excess of suppliers in the market! The sophisticated producer can
do so because of his unique ability to recognize the pattern of prices.
This “toy model” has no pretension of being realistic, nor do we claim that fluctu-
ations in the economy are contrived by economic agents. We only wish to demonstrate
the possibility that when agents diﬀer in their ability to understand patterns, prices can
fluctuate endogenously in a way that is perceived by some agents as random and by
others as deterministic. The latter agents can then benefit relative to their situation in
a simple stationary equilibrium.
5 A Comment on Strategies with Bounded Recall
Let us review the deliberations of the decision makers in the previous sections. In each
period, a decision maker chooses an action whose payoﬀ depends on the realization
of a parameter determined independently of his choice. We refer to the determination
of this parameter as nature’s move. For concreteness, we focus on the case in which
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nature chooses a cyclical sequence {xt} consisting of 0’s and 1’s and in every period
the decision maker chooses either 0 or 1 with the objective of guessing xt correctly. A
decision maker characterized by a number k first learns the frequencies of the successors
of any word of k letters and then chooses the more likely letter given the frequencies
which he correctly infers. Hence, his strategy is a function of the last k observations
(xt−k, ..., xt−1) of nature’s moves. Because the sequence {xt} faced by the decision maker
is determined independently of his choices, this specification of the strategies seems to
be a natural one.
Consider now an alternative approach to this decision problem. Suppose that the
decision maker is not sure about the causality between his actions and the sequence
{xt} and does not exclude the possibility that this sequence responds, in some fashion,
to his own choices. To test the claim that his own past actions may be a better predictor
than nature’s past moves, he employs a strategy that selects his current guess as a
function of his own past k guesses. One would expect that no strategy of this type could
do better than all the strategies of the former type. The decision maker’s guesses do not
aﬀect nature’s moves and thus there is no reason why they should be more informative
than nature’s moves, especially as the latter are part of nature’s informational base.
This intuition is not generally true. Again, we use DeBruijn sequences to illustrate
this point. Consider, for example, the case in which k = 1 and nature’s move is a
DeBruijn sequence of order 3 such as the infinite repetition of (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1). Any
guessing strategy which depends only on nature’s last move will result in a 50% success
rate. In contrast, if the decision maker chooses a rule that uses his own past actions, he
can generate the sequence (0, 1, 0, 1, ....) by reversing his own last guess. This strategy
yields a success rate of 75%. If somehow the decision maker chooses to alternate 0 and
1 independently of nature’s moves, then he will discover that after his choice of 0 it is
more likely that nature chooses 1 and after his choice of 1 it is more likely that nature
chooses 0. His behavior in each period is a consistent response to this inference.
Such behavior, however, does not seem to follow a natural procedure of deliberation.
A decision maker who conditions his action on his last k choices must also choose an
initial condition. Indeed, the sequence (1, 0, 1, 0, ....) is also produced by the same gen-
erating rule but guesses nature’s move correctly only 1/4 of the time. In contrast, in the
original specification of the notion of strategy, the initial history is determined uniquely
by nature.
We find this observation somewhat puzzling. A decision maker might find knowl-
edge of his past behavior more valuable than knowledge of nature’s moves and might
erroneously conclude, that he has the power to aﬀect nature’s moves.3
The standard definition of a strategy in game theory calls for yet another type of
strategy: the decision maker’s action depends on both nature’s past actions and his own.
With perfect recall, this definition of a strategy includes redundant components since a
player can make do with conditioning his actions only on nature’s moves. This inclusion
of redundancies in the definition of a strategy in game theory is discussed in Rubinstein
(1991).
3AR (this footnote does not necessarily reflect the view of MP): Does this observation demonstrate
how easily an individual facing a complex world may conclude that he has power over nature?
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Whereas it might be surprising that a guessing strategy based on the decision maker’s
own actions is better than all strategies based on nature’s moves, it is not surprising
that the decision maker can improve his performance further if he conditions his action
on both his past actions and nature’s past moves. Recalling one’s own actions in the
past is a way to enhance recall of nature’s moves.
Suppose, for example, that k = 3 and that nature generates the DeBruijn sequence
of order 4,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, ....
By definition, any guessing strategy based on the last three moves of nature will
yield only a 50% chance of success. However, if the decision maker’s guess depends on
his own last three guesses and has the form of the DeBruijn sequence of order 3 with
cycle 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1...., the decision maker improves his rate of success to 3/44. If the
decision maker can base his guess on the nature’s last 3 choices as well as on his own
last 3 guesses, he can generate the sequence
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, ....,
which predicts nature’s move correctly 7/8 of the time. In general, a decision maker
characterized by k and facing a DeBruijn sequence of order kn = k + 1 must have a
frequency of mistakes of at least 1
2(k+1)
.5
Comment on the literature:
A branch of the literature on repeated games has studied the eﬀects of diﬀerences in
players’ abilities to generate strategies on the set of equilibria. Two types of constraints
on players’ strategies have received special attention. In Neyman (1985) and Ben Porath
(1993) players use finite automate of bounded size. In Lehrer (1988) players have bounds
on the number of periods they can recall from the past. In both cases, the action of a
player in a particular period can depend on his own past actions.
This literature has mostly focused on the conditions under which a “misleader”
can misleads a “guesser” who observes the misleader’s sequence of actions. Neyman
(1996)’s results imply, in particular, that a misleader can generate deterministic, n-
periodic sequences that any automaton of size m, where mlogm = o(n), will mismatch
in almost 50% of the periods. Gossner and Hernandez (2001) show that there exists a
4It is easy to see that the rate of mistakes must be at least 3/16. At any time that nature moves
through the 16-element cycle, there must be one mistake in the first 4 periods (otherwise the decision
maker will follow the constant 0) and, similarly, one mistake in the last 4 periods. If there is no mistake
in periods 5-12, the sequence must continue with either 1010 or 0110 having two mistakes during periods
13-16.
5To see this, note that any strategy will induce a cycle of pairs of decision maker’s actions and
nature’s move of length L2k+1 for some natural number L (recall that the length of a cycle of a DeBruijn
sequence of order k + 1 is 2k+1). If an agent makes m mistakes in the cycle, then there are at most
(k+1)m periods t in the cycle for which at least one mistake is made in one of the periods (t−k, ..., t). If
(k+1)m < L2
k+1−1
2 , by a counting argument there must be two periods, t and t
0, and two (k+1)-tuples,
(x1, ..., xk, 0) and (x1, ..., xk, 1), such that (at−k, ..., at) = (x1, ..., xk, 0), (at
0−k, ..., at
0
) = (x1, ..., xk, 1),
and the agent guesses correctly in the periods t − k, ..., t and t0 − k, ..., t0. However, if the decision
maker guesses correctly the last k periods, he holds the same memory history at periods t and t0; thus,
he cannot predict correctly nature’s move in both periods. Hence, (k + 1)m > L2k+1−12 . Obviously, it
must be also true that 2(k + 1)m > L2k+1 and thus, the frequency of mistakes is at least 12(k+1) .
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constant c such that for any m satisfying m logm ≥ cn, some automata of the guesser
with m states will be able to match almost any n-periodic sequence of the misleader,
with a proportion going to 1 as n goes to infinity.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994) and Lehrer (1994) also notice that diﬀerences in mem-
ory sometimes allow longer-memory players to correlate their actions in a way that is
concealed from the other players.
The considerations presented in this section may be relevant to the discussion of
the meaning of a strategy in repeated games with bounded recall. The analysis of Nash
equilibrium in repeated game with perfect recall does not depend on whether a player
can condition his action on his own past actions. However, it seems that the set of
Nash equilibria of a repeated game with bounded recall and diﬀerences in the players’
depths of memory might vary depending on whether the histories include the players’
own actions.
6 Discussion
Our aim has been to construct a formal tool for modeling diﬀerences among agents
in their ability to recognize temporal patterns of prices. We applied this tool to two
economic models and showed that price fluctuations that are independent of economic
fundamentals can emerge in equilibrium.
We wish to emphasize the diﬀerence between this paper’s approach and standard
models of asymmetric information. In the latter, conventional models, agents diﬀer in
the information that they possess about the fundamentals in the economy. In our model,
the asymmetry of information is not exogenous and depends on the equilibrium price
sequence.
A related approach would be to allow prices to depend on “sunspots” that are ob-
served only by some agents. Our paper shows that fluctuations in prices and diverse
limitations to agents’ abilities serve a similar role.
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